We illustrate through example 1 and 2 that the condition at theorem 1 in [8] dissatisfies necessity, and the converse proposition of fact 1.1 in [8] does not hold, namely the condition
Introduction
In April 2001, we put forward the REESSE1 public-key encryption scheme [1] . In September 2003, we proposed the REESSE1 public-key cryptosystem which is an extension of the first version, and includes both encryption and signature [2] . In May 2005, it was argued that the lever function ℓ(.) is necessary and sufficient for the security of the REESSE1 encryption [3] . In [3] , the continued fraction method of analyzing the key transforms C x ≡ A x W and C x ≡ A x W ℓ (x) (% M) with x ∈ [1, n] and ℓ (x) ∈ Ω was mentioned earlier than in any other publications. In November 2006, an abbreviation of the REESSE1+ cryptosystem was submitted to eprint.iacr.org [4] .
As is pointed out in [4] , the set Ω = {5δ, …, (n + 4)δ | δ ≥ 1} is not unique, and other Ω may be selected -Ω = {n + 1, …, n + n} with ℓ (i) + ℓ (j) ≠ ℓ (k) ∀ i, j, k ∈ [1, n] for example. Clearly, Ω is a security dominant parameter, and just like p and q in the RSA cryptosystem.
In May 2005, [5] pointed out that the REESSE1 signature scheme was insecure, which is right.
In July 2005, [6] thought unreasoningly that the REESSE1 encryption scheme was insecure, which is wrong, and rebutted thoroughly by us in [7] . Moreover, [7] illuminated definitely that the idea of the continued fraction analysis of REESSE1 did not originate from [6] (naturally also not from [8] ), ant the idea firstly formally appeared in our 2004 application for a national fund project [7] . What needs to be pointed out further is that the authors of [8] are the related reviewers of our 2004 application.
In December 2006, [8] thought unreasoningly again that the REESSE1+ public-key cryptosystem is not secure at all, which connotes any private key in REESSE1+ can be extracted by [8] . It is of flubdub and gulf.
The ancients said 'stop an advancing army with troops, and stop onrushing water with earth '. In what follows, the function f in [8] is namely the function ℓ in [4] , namely f (i), f (j), f (k) in [8] are equivalent to ℓ (i), ℓ (j), ℓ (k), unless otherwise specified, the sign  represents 'M -1', the sign % does 'modulo', and unattached (x) does x-th expression.
In short, there exist 6 grave faults in [8] :
The converse proposition of fact 1.1 does not hold.
Clearly, fact 1.1 implies that if f (i) + f (j) = f (k), then Z / M -p u / q u < 1 / (2 q u 2 ) with L / A k = p u / q u .
We will prove by a counterexample that the former is only sufficient, but not necessary, namely if Z / M -p u / q u < 1 / (2 q u 2 ), then f (i) + f (j) = f (k) do not necessarily hold, and also namely Z / M -p u / q u < 1 / (2 q u
for f (i) + f (j) = f (k) is only necessary, but not sufficient. 
Both algorithm 1 based on fact 4 and algorithm 2 based on table 1 are disordered & wrong logically.
To achieve so-called "breaking", the example in [8] was woven elaborately, and table 2 was falsified, namely its authors intendedly mutilated the two tuple data to cause indeterminacy.
The inverse T -1 %  does not exist, and Q -1 %  not necessarily exist.
Additionally, the case of
Therefore, the cryptanalysis of the REESSE1+ cryptosystem by [8] is a type of pseudo-attack and balderdash leading to which the most radical reason is that the authors of [8] are not aware of the indeterminacy of the lever function ℓ (.) namely f (.), as is mentioned in [4] :
, and
where ṕ is the maximal prime allowed.
Another vital reason is that [8] always regarded necessary conditions for f (i) + f (j) = f (k) as sufficient and necessary conditions, and [8] did not consider the whole space of private keys or public keys.
Theorem 1 vs the REESSE1+ Cryptosystem

Condition at Theorem 1 in [8] Dissatisfies Necessity
Theorem 1 in [8] is retailed as follows:
Theorem 1: Let α be a real number, and let r / s be a rational with gcd(r, s) = 1 and |α -r / s| < 1 / (2s 2 ).
Then r / s is a convergent of the continued fraction expansion of α.
Here, |α -r / s| represents the absolute value of (α -r / s).
The proof of theorem 1 is referred to [9] .
The condition |α -r / s| < 1 / (2s 2 ) is only sufficient for r / s to be a convergent of the continued fraction of α, but not necessary. Namely if r / s is a convergent of the continued fraction of α, |α -r / s| < 1 / (2s 2 ) does not necessarily hold.
An example is taken.
Let r / s = 2 / 13, and then 1 / 2s 2 = 1 / (2 × 13 2 ) = 0.002958579882.
Let α = 2039 / 13001, and then 2039 / 13001 -2 / 13 = 0.002987935839 > 0.002958579882 = 1 / (2 × 13 2 ).
On the other hand, the continued fraction of 2039 / 13001 is 1 / (6 + (1 / (2 + 1 / (1 + … 1 / 3)))).
Thus, 2 / 13 is a convergent of the continued fraction of 2039 / 13001, which illustrates |α -r / s| < 1 / (2s 2   ) is not necessary for r / s to be a convergent of the continued fraction of α.
A k Will Emerge But Is Undecidable If f
Assume that ṕ is the maximum prime in the cryptosystem, {A 1 , …, A n } is a coprime sequence with 0 <
n is a public key [4] , where n ≥ 6,
where L is a positive integer.
Dividing the either side of the above equation by (M A k ) yields
Obviously, when n > 2 + 1, (1′) may have a variant, namely
In terms of theorem 1, L / A k is a convergent of the continued fraction of Z / M.
Note that if p u / q u satisfies (1″), then p u + 1 / q u + 1 , p u + 2 / q u + 2 , …, p t / q t also likely satisfies (1″).
Therefore, there likely exist multiple values of L / A k by (1″), and A k is undetermined.
However, if we do not know in advance whether
but not sufficient, which will be discussed further in what follows. is the precondition of q u+1 > q u ∆ which is the dominant basis of alg.1 [8] . Fact 1.1 [8] :
Converse Proposition of
Notice that it is possible that
, and moreover not fact 1.1 but its converse is the inner logical base of alg.1 in [8] .
Through a counterexample, we will prove that the converse proposition of fact 1.1 does not hold, that is,
Example 2.
For convenience in computing, let n = 6, {A x } = {11, 10, 3, 7, 17, 13}, δ = 1, and M = 510931.
, and f(6) = 8. Randomly select i = 1, j = 3, and k = 5. In this case,
According to (1) ,
By the Euclidean algorithm, a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , … are found out, and thus the continued fraction of
Heuristically let
which indicates that probably A 5 = 11. On this occasion, there is 186640 / 510931 -4 / 11 = 0.0016575801
The above expression satisfies (1″), namely the condition at theorem 1, and thereby A 5 = 11 less than the maximum in {A x } is deduced, which is in direct contradiction to factual A 5 = 17. [8] : There is sharp increase from q u to q u+1 since q u+1
The derivation of fact 1.2 in [8] is retailed as follows:
According to theorem 1 and convergence of sequence {p 0 / q 0 , p 1 / q 1 , …, p t / q t }, we obtain that
Is the above derivation right? See the following analysis.
Clearly, by the definition of a finite continued fraction, (2′) holds. In addition, in terms of [9] , p u+1 are q u+1 are coprime, and there is q u+1 ≥ A k = q u , which is a judgment foundation.
If
practical observations, in most cases, there is also
According to (2′) and (3′), we have either
does not necessarily hold, which indicates that
there is a logic error during the derivation of (3) in [8] .
Moreover, from (2′) and (3′) we can judge that when n is large enough -80 for example, the probability that (3′′′) holds is greater than one that (3″) holds. Now, we review fact 1.3 in [8] . It is retailed as follows: Fact 1.3 [8] : Observe an example once more.
In example 3, suppose that the bit-length of a plaintext block is 8, and two bits of a block correspond to three items of a coprime sequence {A x }, which means that the encryption algorithm is optimized through a compact binary sequence. In practice, we do just so.
Apparently, the length of {A x } is 3 × (8 / 2) = 12.
Example 3.
Let {A x } = {{23, 11, 17}, {41, 29, 26}, {15, 19, 37}, {31, 7, 43}}, and
= 16, f (9) = 5, f (10) = 13, f (11) = 15, and f (12) = 7. Additionally, this example also illustrates that when one attempts to infer the suitable factors of the
with every f (x) ∈ Ω = {n + 1, …, 2n}, indeterminacy is increased remarkably.
Condition at Fact 4 Is Insufficient for f (i) + f (j) = f (k)
In [6] , the attackers attempted to seek A k dominantly by the converse proposition of fact 1.1, and however, disturbing values of A k are too many to determine the original value of A k . Therefore, in [8] , the attackers attempted to diminish indeterminacy of A k through fact 4 which connotes fact 1.1, and is equivalent to each of fact 1.2 and 1.3.
To say the least, even if fact 4 is valid sometimes, we can prove by a counterexample that the condition at fact 4 is insufficient for
Example 4.
Still let n = 6, {A x } = {11, 10, 3, 7, 17, 13}, and M = 510931 > 11 × 10 × 3 × 7 × 17 × 13 = 510510.
Arbitrarily select W = 17797, f(1) = 9, f(2) = 6, f(3) = 10, f(4) = 5, f(5) = 7, and f(6) = 8. Randomly select i = 1, j = 3 , and k = 6. In this case,
Compute the continued fraction of186640 / 510931 being In addition, evidently prime〈1〉 = 2, prime〈2〉 = 3, prime〈3〉 = 5, prime〈4〉 = 7, prime〈5〉 = 11, prime〈6〉 = 13, prime〈7〉 = 17, and prime〈8〉 = 19 which are according to [8] .
Then, by fact 4 in [8] , m = 7, and ∆ = (M / (2∏ m x=n -2 prime〈x〉)) 1 / 2 = (15) 1 / 2 = 3.8729.
, and every A x will likely be evaluated to at least two eligible values (see example 5).
Because the condition at fact 4 is insufficient for f (i) + f (j) = f (k), property 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are invalid.
Further, the run result of alg.1 regarding an arbitrary public key {C 1 , …, C n } as an input will contain enormous disturbing data as n ≥ 80, and it is infeasible that alg.2 find out the original coprime sequence {A x } in polynomial time (see example 5), which manifests that alg.1 and 2 are invalid. Table 2 Is Falsified
Example in [8] Is Woven Elaborately and Data at
Example in [8] Illustrates Nothing about Breaking
It is easily understood that according to fact 1.1 and 4, the authors of [8] can weave an example consistent with alg.1 and 2 since the lever function value {f (1), …, f (n)} may be known in advance;
the coprime sequence {A 1 , …, A n } may be selected elaborately in advance;
However, as is indicated in the above rebutment, a consistent example does not illustrates that a related {A x } can be extracted accurately from an arbitrary public key {C x } when {f (x)} and {A x } are unknown in advance. The authors of [8] at most broke "their own REESSE1+", which diverted themselves, but not our REESSE1+ with choice parameters. It is well understood that even though a cryptosystem is RSA or ECC, its parameter is must also selected; otherwise the cryptosystem is insecure.
The example in [8] is neither readable nor verifiable in short time, and the proportion of n to log 2 M is not also proper, which contravenes the optimization principle for the modulus M in the REESSE1+
cryptosystem. An obvious truth is that if M is too large, the length of a public key will increase rapidly.
Therefore, M should be as small as possible while at least meets M > ∏ n x = 1 A x meantime. Selection of the sequence {A x } in [8] also contravenes the optimization principle.
The intent for [8] to select such a large M that n is out of proportion to log 2 M seems to want to increase the necessity of the conditions at fact 1.1 and 4 for f (i) + f (j) = f (k). However, it can not increase the sufficiency of the conditions.
Data at Table 2 Is Falsified for a Compatible Effect
In above paragraphs, we illustrate that the condition
. Property I will make us better understand it.
1) there always exist
2) C i , C j , C k make (1″) hold with A′ k ≤ ṕ in all probability.
Proof:
1)
Let Ο d be an oracle for a discrete logarithm.
In terms of group theories, ∀ A′ k ∈ {2, …, ṕ}, the equation
we can obtain many distinct pairs (A′ i , A′ j ), where A′ i ,
It is easily seen from the above equations the values of W′ and f ′(k) do not influence the value of A′ i A′ j .
, the number of value of A′ i A′ j is ṕ -1.
Let M = 2 q ṕ 2 A′ k , where q is a rational number.
According to (1),
When
which satisfies (1″).
Assume that the value of A′ i A′ j distributes uniformly on (1, M). Then, the probability that A′ i A′ j makes (1″) hold is
It is seen that the probability is very large.
According to property I.2, for a certain C k ∈ {C 1 , …, C n } and ∀ C i , C j ∈ {C 1 , …, C n }, A k will have roughly n 2 values by (1″) namely the condition at fact 1.1, including the repeated, and considering the symmetry, almost every value has at least one counterpart.
Of course, if the condition at fact 4, namely q u+1 > q u ∆ which connotes (1″) is used as a constraint, the number of values of A k = q u will decrease. Example 4 already shows that even though
eligible A k can still be found.
Notice that when i, j, k all fix on, it is fully possible that L / A k has multiple satisfactory values, which implies multiple convergents of the continued fraction of Z / M likely meet (1″) and even q u+1 > q u ∆ .
To clarify the matter thoroughly, we program by alg.1 in MS Visual C++, make an executable file, repeat the experiment regarding the public key at the example in [8] as input, and obtain the following output which is classified the same as in [8] :
A 2 = 253 (7, 5, 2), (9, 6, 2), (5, 7, 2), (6, 9, 2) A 10 = 1894 (9, 6, 10), (6, 9, 10)
A 10 = 6957 (9, 7, 10), (7, 9, 10) Table I : Output of the program by alg. 1 given the public key at the example in [8] Obviously, table 2 
Example in [8] Is Woven Elaborately and Alg.2 in [8] Is Invalid
In the above, it is mentioned that at most the authors of [8] broke "their own REESSE1+", because the example in [8] is woven elaborately, and the parameters {A x } and {f (x)} are selected deliberately.
If we use another set of parameters for producing a public key as the input of the program by alg.1, the output result will contains so many disturbing data that the original sequence {A 1 , …, A n } can not be distinguished in polynomial time. A 3 = 77 (6, 4, 3) , (4, 6, 3) , (10, 8, 3) , (8, 10, 3) A 3 = 11 (10, 4, 3) , (7, 6, 3) , (6, 7, 3) , (8, 8, 3) , (4, 10, 3) A 3 = 2113 (8, 7, 3) , (7, 8, A 5 = 37 (6, 6, 5) , (10, 6, 5) , (6, 10, 5) A 6 = 187125 (6, 1, 6) , (1, 6, 6) A 6 = 121089 (6, 2, 6) , (2, 6, 6) A 7 = 187125 (7, 1, 7), (1, 7, 7)
A 7 = 121089 (7, 2, 7), (2, 7, 7)
A 7 = 3 (9, 3, 7), (3, 9, 7)
A 8 = 187125 (8, 1, 8) , (1, 8, 8) A 8 = 34945619 (6, 2, 8) , (2, 6, 8) A 8 = 121089 (8, 2, 8) , (2, 8, 8) A 9 = 187125 (9, 1, 9), (1, 9, 9) A 9 = 121089 (9, 2, 9), (2, 9, 9)
A 9 = 5 (6, 4, 9) , (4, 6, 9) , (10, 8, 9) , (8, 10, 9) A 9 = 15 (8, 6, 9) , (6, 8, 9) , (10, 10, 9) A 10 = 259970 (4, 1, 10), (1, 4, 10) A 10 = 187125 (10, 1, 10), (1, 10, 10) A 10 = 121089 (10, 2, 10), (2, 10, 10)
A 10 = 7629 (8, 3, 10) , (3, 8, 10) Table 1 in [8] .
Again for instance, arbitrarily select compatible A 3 = 11, A 9 = 5, A 5 = 37, A 7 = 3, and A 1 = 187125, and find out f(3) = 14, f(9) = 13, f(5) = 12, f(7) = 11, and f(1) = 10 by Table 1 in [8] .
Therefore, if keep Ω = {5, .., n + 4} unvaried, we may select fit {A x } and W so as to make the time complexity of the continued fraction attack by q u+1 > q u ∆ and table 1 get to at least O(2 n ), which elucidates that the example woven elaborately in [8] has no practical meaning, and alg.2 in [8] is invalid.
However, we had best select fit Ω while let {A x } and W random so as to avoid attack by (1′) (see sect.5.1). Table 1 
Distribution of Tuples Relating A k does not Follow
in [8]
In addition, from table II we also observe that A 2 = 17 involves 6 tuples, and A 5 = 37 involves 3 tuples (but in fact, 6 tuples is impossible, and f(5) = 10), which indicates that the distribution of tuples relating A k does not follow table 1 in [8] . Besides, considering A 3 = 11 from 5 tuples, A 9 = 5 from 4 tuples etc, we see
, that is, the converse proposition of fact 2.2 does not hold.
Why Is
, we see that {5δ, …, (n + 4)δ | δ ≥ 1} is substantially the same as {5, …, n + 4}.
Although [8] 
, namely (1′) will filter out the most of disturbing data as n is large, which makes REESSE1+ be faced with danger. Therefore, in
, Ω needs to be complicated, namely had best select Ω = {5, 7, …, 19, 53, 55, …} which is an odd set of 2n elements such that ∀ e 1 , e 2 ∈ Ω, e 1 ≠ e 2 , ∀ e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ∈ Ω, e 1 + e 2 ≠ e 3 , ∀ e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 ∈ Ω, e 1 + e 2 + e 3 ≠ e 4 . of Ω are relatively large, decryption speed will decrease greatly.
Key Transform
To keep Ω = {5, …, n + 4} unvaried, the key transform should be strengthened, so in REESSE1+ v2.1,
In this way, REESSE1+ v2.1 is not only secure but also swift. 
)
-Q T is also at least the discrete logarithm problem.
Forging Attack in [8] May Be Easily Avoided through Turning D | (δ Q -W) to D | (δ Q -WH)
In REESSE1+ [4] , we definitely pointed out that Q ≠ Q 1 , where Q is produced currently, and Q 1 is any of signature foreparts produced ever before. Of course, Q ≠ Q 1 implied that the linear combination of Q 1 with Q 2 should be excluded from signature foreparts. However, such exclusion is infeasible in polynomial time.
Therefore, in practical applications, it is suggested as a shortcut that users move the parameter H in Q ≡ In this wise, the forgery attack in [8] is easily avoided, namely Q′ can not be forged out at least in polynomial time.
Notice that correspondingly, the λ S in the signature algorithm and the discriminant in the verification algorithm should also be adjusted.
Conclusion
The above rebuttal shows that each or the combination of (1″), q u+1 > q u ∆, and table 1 is not sufficient for f (i) + f (j) = f (k), there exist logic errors in the deduction of (3), and alg.1 based on fact 4 and alg.2 based on table 1 are not valid. Additional, the signature forgery attack in [8] is easily avoided. Hence, the conclusion of [8] that REESSE1+ is not secure at all (which connotes that [8] can extract a related private key from any public key in REESSE1+) is completely incorrect, as long as Ω is fitly selected, REESSE1+
with C x ≡ A x W f(x) (% M) is secure, and the private key attack in [8] like [6] is a pseudo attack. .
